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The Headless Horseman





Under what conditions is leadership targeting against terrorist groups likely to be 
effective?  This paper develops a theory of leadership (based on work in 
sociology, organizational design, political science (collective action problem), and 
terrorism studies) which argues that leaders potentially perform two main 
functions – they provide inspiration and/or operational direction.  The more 
important the individual leader is in providing these functions to the organization, 
the more likely that leadership targeting will be effective.  Case studies of Aum 
Shinrikyo in Japan, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria, and the Shining 
Path of Peru are used to demonstrate the validity of the argument. 
1  The author would like to thank GM, CG, BO, DB, DL, and LB for their comments and insights.
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When should states target the leaders of terrorist organizations?  More 
specifically, under what conditions is leadership targeting2  likely to be effective and 
when is it likely to be ineffective or even counterproductive?3  Existing explanations look 
at an organization’s size, ideology, and other possible factors, yet surprisingly never look 
at the leader himself.  The argument of this paper is that leadership targeting is most 
likely to be effective the more important a leader is to an organization.  But what makes a 
leader important?  What does the leader do that no one else can do (or do as well) for the 
organization?  To answer this question, this paper develops a theory of leadership that 
argues that leaders potentially perform two main functions: they provide inspiration 
and/or operational direction, although the importance of the leader for providing these 
functions changes over time as the organization itself changes.  
Within the literature on this subject there are different views on the effectiveness 
of leadership targeting.  The “optimists” argue that the strategy has been effective in 
cases like the PKK the Real IRA, the Black Panthers, Action Directe, and others, where 
the death or capture of the terrorist group’s leader resulted in the demise of the group or 
at least some reduction in levels of violence.4  Policymakers seem to share this view; just 
after the September 11 attacks, for example, Colin Powell stated that “it’s not enough to 
get one individual, although we’ll start with that one individual.”5  Likewise, U.S. 
2 Leadership targeting describes operations designed to capture, arrest, or kill the enemy leader, and is used 
interchangeably with the less euphemistic term, decapitation. Effective leadership targeting is defined as a 
decrease in violence by the terrorist organization that results from the loss of the leader.  Effective 
operations are distinguished from successful operations, in which the leader is simply killed or captured.
3 For more on the moral and legal bases of decapitation, see Catherine Lotrionte, “When to Target 
Leaders,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Summer 2003).
4 For a longer list of effective decapitations, see Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Declines,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 1991);  Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends: The 
Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006); Daniel 
Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March/April 2006); Graham H. 
Turbiville, Jr., “Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations,” Joint  
Special Operations University Report (June 2007).  
5 “Bush: bin Laden ‘prime suspect’,” cnn.com, 17 September 2001.  
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policies since 9/11 seem to indicate an expectation that targeting leaders will be effective, 
with operations against Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Saddam Hussein, Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
and Muhammed Atef.  In 2008, U.S. forces are still hunting bin Laden with the 
expectation that his capture or death would be “a major blow to al-Qaeda.”6   
The “pessimists” argue that leadership targeting is ineffective and sometimes 
counterproductive.  Israel’s targeting of Hamas leaders, some argue, were 
inconsequential or even led to an increase in violence.7  Russia’s targeting operations 
against Chechen insurgent leaders have not resulted in any diminishment of that conflict,8 
nor did the killing of Abbas al-Musawi in 1992 hinder Hezbollah’s ability to target Israel. 
More nuanced approaches observe that the effectiveness of leadership targeting 
varies,9 and argue that it depends on a particular variable or set of variables.10 
Surprisingly, only a few studies look at the notion of leadership and how it varies when 
trying to predict the effectiveness of leadership targeting.  Of those that do, their 
arguments tend to be more observational than theoretical,11 and do not offer rigorous 
models, frameworks, or theories and do not test their claims with data.12  
6 Greg Bruno, “Current and Future Trends in Special Operations Warfare,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
www.cfr.org/publication/16839/ quoting Michael Vickers, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent Capabilities.  
7 Steven David, “Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” Ethics &International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2003). 
Mohammed M. Hafez and Joseph M. Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations Work? A Multivariate 
Analysis of Israel’s Controversial Tactic during the Al-Aqsa Uprising,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
Vol. 29, No. 4 (June 2006), p. 362.  
8 Turbiville, “Hunting Leadership Targets,” pp. 74, 77.  
9 Lisa Langdon, Alexander J. Sarapu, and Matthew Wells, “Targeting the Leadership of Terrorist and 
Insurgent Movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers,” Journal of Public and 
International Affairs, Vol. 15 (Spring 2005).   
10 Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” Security  
Studies forthcoming, identifies three independent variables: the goals, the size, and the age of the group. 
Decapitation is most likely to be effective against new, small, and ideological groups.
11 Stephen T. Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders (RAND, 2001); Brian Michael Jenkins, Should 
Our Arsenal Against Terrorism Include Assassination? (Santa Monica: RAND, 1987).
12 The exceptions would be Jordan, “When Heads Roll;” Patrick Johnston, “The Effectiveness of 
Leadership Decapitation in Counterinsurgency,” unpublished manuscript; Aaron Mannes, “Testing the 
Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing its Leader Reduce a Terrorist Group’s Activity,” The 
Journal of International Policy Solutions, Vol. 9 (Spring 2008).
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In the next section of the paper a general theory of leadership will be developed 
that asks what, precisely, might make an individual leader valuable to an organization. 
The ramifications of the theory in relation to leadership targeting will then be explored. 
The final section will present case studies from Algeria, Peru, and Japan that offer 
insights into why some cases of leadership targeting were effective and why others were 
not.
A Theory of Leadership
What do leaders do?  Why are they necessary?  What makes leaders valuable to an 
organization?  How and why do these factors vary?  This paper hypothesizes that leaders 
might perform two functions for a terrorist organization: provide inspiration and 
operational direction.  Both of these may change over time as the organization grows or 
declines.
INSPIRATION
Terrorist organizations face a collective action problem.13  Joining a violent opposition 
group is almost always irrational for an individual because he will achieve the benefits 
gained by the group whether or not he participates, but will only suffer the costs if he 
13 Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice,” in 
Walter Reich, ed., The Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1998).  For more on selective incentives and the collective 
action problem, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of  
Groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political  
Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Mark Irving 
Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995); and Jeremy Weinstein, 
Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
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joins.  When an inspirational leader14 exists, he can overcome this individual irrationality 
by inspiring potential members through his articulation of a common ideology and/or by 
his charisma, either of which can create a collective rationality so that individuals 
calculate costs and benefits as part of a larger group.15  An inspirational leader can create 
a no longer An inspirational leader can also overcome the collective action problem with 
his charisma.  Followers may act “irrationally” – in ways that they otherwise would not – 
in order to please or impress the charismatic leader. These two components of inspiration 
leadership – charisma and ideology – are discussed below.  
CHARISMA.16  In Max Weber’s classic exposition, charismatic leaders hold 
“specific gifts of the body and spirit” that must be “proven in life.  If he wants to be a 
prophet, he must perform miracles; if he wants to be a war lord, he must perform heroic 
deeds.”17  Beyond the supernatural component, charisma may also be used to describe 
secular individuals who possess a “’magnetic’ political personality,”18 the specifics of 
which vary across cultures and time.19  There must also be a resonance between a 
14 Leadership that both creates ideology and is charismatic is often labeled transformational (in contrast to 
transactional) leadershp in the organizational theory literature.  Bryman, “Leadership in Organizations,” pp. 
281-282 cites the work of Burns and Bass on transformational leadership. 
15 Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism,” pp. 8-9.  See also S. Alexander Haslam and Michael J. Platow, 
“The Link Between Leadership and Followership: How Affirming Social Identity Translates Vision Into 
Action,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 11 (November 2001), p. 1470; Elisabeth 
Jean Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. 19; and Alan Bryman, “Leadership in Organizations,” in Stewart R. Clegg, Cynthia Hardy, 
and Walter R. Nord, eds., Handbook of Organization Studies (London: Sage Publications, 1996), p. 277.
16 Gordom McCormick’s unpublished manuscript, “The Revolutionary Hero,” informs much of this section.
17 Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, transs. and eds., H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 245, 249.  See also Arthur Schweitzer, “Theory and 
Political Charisma,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16, No. 2 (March 1974); Bernard 
Bass, Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1981), p. 152; Gary Yukl, 
Leadership in Organizaions, 4th edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1998), pp. 298-300; Arthur 
J. Deikman, “The Psychological Power of Charismatic Leaders in Cults and Terrorist Organizations,” in 
James J. F. Forest, ed., The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 2006); Robert C. Tucker, “Personality and Political Leadership,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
92, No. 3 (Fall 1997), p. 388.
18 Martin E. Spencer, “What is Charisma?” The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 
1973), p. 342.
19 Ann Ruth Willner and Dorothy Willner, “The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders,” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 358 (March 1965), pp. 77 and 83.
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charismatic leader and his followers.20 When there is this link or resonance between 
leaders and followers, it allows charismatic leadership to overcome the initial collective 
action problem.  Followers will act in what would otherwise be individually irrational 
ways because the charismatic leader has, through his charisma, inspired them to act on 
his behalf or the group’s behalf, rather than just for the expected benefits.21  In effect, the 
leader creates zealots.22
IDEOLOGY.  A leader can also inspire through the articulation of an ideology.23 
An ideology is a mental framework that is descriptive and normative – it explains the 
“world as it is and as it ought to be.”24  At the most basic level, every terrorist ideology 
provides the answers to five essential questions: what is the problem, who is the enemy, 
what is the solution, what are the legitimate means to achieve the desired ends, and how 
does the current fight fit into a larger context?25  The problem identified by terrorist 
ideologies range from capitalism and foreign occupation to secularism and globalization, 
to name just a few.  The enemy is the source of this problem.  In identifying the enemy, 
the ideology also makes distinctions of us-versus-them and is therefore an important 
source of communal identity.26  The solution is the intended end-state, and can range 
from concessions to the outright destruction of the state.  The means are the tactics that 
are justified according to notions of legitimacy and can range from peaceful political 
protests to mass civilian casualties from weapons of mass destruction.  The context 
20 Haslam and Platow, “The Link Between Leadership and Followership,” p. 1469.
21 Willner and Willner, “The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders,” p. 79.  Thomas E. Dow, Jr., “The 
Theory of Charisma,” The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Summer 1969), p. 308 calls this an 
“irrational bond.”  
22 Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dillemma, p. 168 and p. 62.
23 Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dillemma, pp. 36-37.
24 Willner and Willner, “The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders,” p. 79. 
25 Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dillemma, pp. 92-93 uses essentially similar concepts.
26 Haslam and Platow, “The Link Between Leadership and Followership;” Lichbach, The Rebel’s  
Dillemma, pp. 124-125.
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provides “a sense of continuity between [the current] mission and [the] legendary heroes 
and missions.”27  The context can be one of Islam versus the Christian West, for example, 
or the 400-year struggle to unite Ireland under Irish Catholic rule. 
Whether or not a leader is responsible for the ideological inspiration can vary. 
Some leaders provide different or innovative answers to these questions, while other 
leaders continue with the ideological vision of their predecessors or follow a well-known 
ideology.
CHANGES OVER TIME.  Even when leaders do inspire, their importance in 
providing inspiration can diminish over time.  As organizations grow, new members will 
have ever-decreasing access to the inspirational leader.28  Therefore, if the leader’s 
charisma and vision (ideology) are to be adopted by new followers, they must be able to 
access the inspiration of the leader even if they cannot access the person.29  This is 
accomplished through what Weber calls “routinization.”30  The routinization of the 
charisma of a leader “involves creation and maintenance of symbols, myths, rites, rituals 
and ceremonies which reflect the values inherent in the vision [of the leader].”31 
Likewise, the routinization of the leader’s ideology can occur through the promulgation 
of texts and other media that describe his vision.32  For example, bin Laden’s version of 
Salafist ideology has become widespread through his writings, videos, and internet 
postings.33    
27 Willner and Willner, “The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders,” p. 83.
28 Werner Stark, “The Routinization of Charisma,” Sociological Analysis, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Winter 1965), p. 
206.
29 Michael A. Toth, “Toward a Theory of the Routinization of Charisma,” (April 1972), p. 1.
30 Dow, “The Theory of Charisma,” p. 307; Willner and Willner, “The Rise and Role of Charismatic 
Leaders,” p. 80.
31 Chanoch Jacobsen and Robert House, “The Rise and Decline of Charismatic Leadership,” unpublished 
manuscript (1999), p. 6.
32 Stark, “The Routinization of Charisma,” p. 207.
33 See Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003); Marc Sageman, 
Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 
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While the importance of the leader in providing inspiration generally diminishes 
over time because of routinization, there are also cases of what might be called 
“resurgent” leaders.  In these cases, a new leader with a high level of personal charisma 
or with a new vision of the organization’s ideology arises, as will be seen in the case 
study of Algeria.   
OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE
Leaders often do more than just inspire their followers; they also command them to do 
certain things, specifically by designing and executing strategies to achieve the groups’ 
objectives, while also building the organization itself and developing external alliances.34 
This kind of operational guidance is characterized here as the control over strategy, 
tactics, and organizational issues.  
STRATEGY.  Strategy, in essence, is the matching of ways and means to the ends 
that are sought.35  While the ideology itself may identify the desired ends, operationally 
important leaders decide what means should be used to achieve those ends.  For terrorist 
leaders, these decisions often revolve around the role of violence.  Should the 
organization use violence, engage in the political process, do some combination of both, 
or something else?  Leaders might also make decisions about the ways these means 
should be used.  If violence is to be utilized, how should it be used?  Against whom? 
Within the jihadi movement, for instance, al-Qaeda shifted the target of its violence from 
the near enemy to the far enemy.36  Sometimes leaders are responsible for these strategic 
2008).
34 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion.
35 Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy” in Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., ed., 
Military Strategy: Theory and Application (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1989).
36 “Ideological Divides Indicate Extremist Fault Lines; Part II: Historical Examples,” Global Issues Report, 
(April 6, 2007).
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decisions while in other cases these decisions are made by consensus or by lower level 
operatives. 
TACTICS.  The leader might also decide what specific targets should be attacked, 
when, and how.  For example, a leader of an Iraqi insurgent group could decide where to 
send his suicide bombers.  Should they attack U.S. military targets, a civilian market, 
economic infrastructure like oil pipelines, or something else?  Is there a time when the 
attack will be the most likely to cause the desired level of carnage (whether high or low)? 
How should the target be attacked?  Terrorists have a range of options to choose from: 
assassinations, car bombs, suicide bombs, airplane hijackings, hostage taking, the use of 
weapons of mass destruction, and so on.  As with the choice of targets, the leader can 
choose which tactic has the best chance of success at the lowest cost.  Again, a leader 
may be responsible for these decisions, or they may be made by others within the 
organization  
ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES.  Besides deciding how the organization acts 
against its enemies, leaders of terrorist organizations also might make decisions about 
how the organization operates internally and with allies.  These internal issues include 
organizational structure, recruitment, finances, logistics, training, and relations with other 
organizations or state entities.  
CHANGES OVER TIME.  When an organization is first formed, the leader is 
able to exercise direct and personal control over his immediate followers.  If the 
organization is to be successful, though, it must grow in size.37  Growth, however, can be 
problematic when the size of the organization exceeds the leader’s span of control (the 
37 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, pp. 128-129.
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number of people that any one person can effectively manage, usually in the range of five 
to seven.)38 
One way organizations cope with growth is by bureaucratizing its operational 
functions whereby a leader gives up control of different functions to subordinates.39 
Even terrorist groups bureaucratize; Hezbollah, for instance, has a Secretary General and 
a Shura Council, as well as function-specific divisions that oversee militant operations, 
social programs, and political activities.40
An alternative way of dealing with the growth of an organization is to 
decentralize it by pushing down operational decision-making into the lower levels of the 
organization.  Al-Qaeda appears to be headed in this direction, with essentially 
independent cells forming and operating on their own without any ties (command and 
control, logistics, training, financing) to the leadership in Pakistan, although the 
remaining centralized core of al-Qaeda is a still a threat.41  
Because of the decentralization and bureaucratization that accompany an 
organization’s growth, usually leaders will become increasingly less operationally 
important over time.  In some cases, however, this process may be resisted by the leader 
himself because, out of ego or other reasons, the founding leader is reluctant to cede 
control to lieutenants or to independent cells.42 As with inspirational leadership, there 
38 Gerald D. Bell, “Determinants of Span of Control,” The American Journal of Scoiology, Vol. 73, No. 1 
(July 1967), p. 100.  The original concept was developed by V. A. Graicunas along with Lyndall Urwick, 
according to Fred Nickols, “The Span of Control and the Formulas of V. A. Graicunas,” available at 
home.att.net/~nickols/graicunas.htm.  
39 Weber is the foundational author for the study of bureaucracy and bureaucratization, see Weber, From 
Max Weber, pp. 196-244.
40 A Nizar Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah: from Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation,” 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1993), p. 326.
41 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, and Marc Sageman, “The Next Generation of Terror,” Foreign Policy 
(March/April 2008).  See also Bruce Hoffman, “The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin 
Laden Still Matters,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3 (May/June 2008).
42 See McCormick, “The Revolutionary Hero;” Willner and Willner, “The Rise and Role of Charismatic 
Leaders,” p. 87; and Jean C. Robinson, “Institutionalizing Charisma: Leadership, Faith & Rationality in 
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may also be a resurgent operational leader.  A leader may decide to try to centralize a 
networked organization, or to exert more control over tactics, timing, and targets in a 
large, hierarchical organization.  
VISUALIZING LEADERSHIP
The following graphic (Figure 1) helps visualize the relationship of the inspirational and 
operational components of leadership.  Operational guidance is on the X-axis, and 
inspiration is on the Y-axis.  Both are composite variables that are unified as one concept 
for the sake of visual simplicity.  The dotted lines are drawn to divide the graphic into 
four idealized leadership types.  At the top right (I), the leader provides both inspiration 
and operational guidance.  At the top left (II), the leader provides inspiration, but not 
operational guidance.  At the bottom right (III), the leader is important operationally but 
not inspirationally.  At the bottom left (IV), the leader is neither important inspirationally 
nor operationally.  
Figure 1:  The Value of Individual Leaders
Three Societies,” Polity, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Winter 1985), p. 184.
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The lines show the changing role of leadership over time, with declining leaders 
moving along some path from cell I to cell IV and resurgent leaders moving in the 
reverse direction.  However, any particular case may have fluctuations, backtracking, and 
zig-zags rather than a simple, inevitable movement in one direction.  
Leadership Targeting
Based on the theory of terrorist leadership described above, the greatest expected 
utility for leadership targeting should occur when the leader provides both inspiration and 
operational guidance.  When inspirational leaders are removed, “the organizations lose 
effectiveness and focus, become prone to infighting, and collapse.”43   When operational 
43 Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy,” p. 40.
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leaders are removed, this “disrupts planning and operations, limits a group’s expertise 
and know-how, and weakens its ability to coordinate attacks.”44  These types of leaders 
are in cell I and are “particularly susceptible to dissolution.  Members may disaffiliate at 
any time, since the ties that bind them together have yet to be woven into the stable 
network of a social structure.”45  
The case where leadership targeting would have the lowest expectations for 
success, not surprisingly, would be cell IV, where inspiration and operational guidance 
have become institutionalized through some combination of routinization, 
bureaucratization, and decentralization.  Even repeated strikes against the leadership 
would be unlikely to be effective since the organization does not look to its leaders for 
inspiration or operational guidance.  
In cells II and III, where the leader provides inspiration or operational guidance, 
but not both, organizations would be somewhat vulnerable to leadership targeting, more 
so than in cell IV, but less than in cell I.  In hypothesizing the expectations of leadership 
targeting in these two middling cells, it is necessary to examine the relative availability of 
inspirational versus operational leadership.  In general, charismatic leaders seem to be 
fairly rare, and leaders with innovative ideological visions even more so.  Sound 
operational guidance, in contrast, can be developed and learned by individuals as they 
rise through the organization.  Some may be better than others, but many will be at least 
adequate.  Everything else being equal, then, one would expect the targeting of strictly 
inspirationally important leaders to have more of an impact than targeting strictly 
operationally important leaders.  
44 Johnston, “The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” p. 9.
45 Marc Galanter and James J. F. Forest, “Cults, Charismatic Groups, and Social Systems: Understanding 
the Transformation of Terrorist Recruits,” in James J. F. Forest, ed., The Making of a Terrorist:  
Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006).
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The conceptualization of leadership developed here provides the theoretical 
foundation for determining the expected utility of targeting terrorist leaders, but for 
policymakers and those involved in specific operations, other considerations should and 
will play an important role. Analysts and decision-makers should ask questions like: How 
capable and dedicated will subsequent leaders be?  Will potential future leaders be 
deterred by the threat of being targeted?  Will organizations take defensive measures that 
force them to lose some of the initiative?  Will decapitation lead to internal turmoil and 
uncertainty that make the organization less effective for some period of time?  How will 
the international community view decapitation?  Will the terrorist group retaliate?  Will 
sympathizers join the group in response?46  
Case Studies
The following section looks at three cases of leadership targeting.  Case studies 
were used because they allow for process tracing and for exploring the causal relationship 
in the most nuanced way.  Also, case studies can hold other factors as constant as 
possible when comparing variation within cases over time, as will be done with the GIA 
and Shining Path.  These cases do not “prove” or “disprove” the theory, but are offered as 
plausibility probes that provide detailed examples of the dynamics of the conceptualized 
framework described above.47  Measuring the value of leaders is difficult, but necessary if 
46 For more on these questions, see David, “Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing;” Byman, “Do Targeted 
Killings Work?” Lotrionte, “When to Target Leaders;” Hafez and Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassinations 
Work?” and Babak Dehganpisheh and Christopher Dickey, “The Real Nasrallah,” Newsweek, (August 
21/28, 2006).
47 Harry Eckstein, “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. 
Polsby , eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7. Political Science: Scope and Theory (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1975).  
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the results are to be verifiable, reliable, and replicable.  However, creating a more 
concrete scale of these measures would impose an unwelcome degree of artificiality to 
the analysis.  Instead, the discussion of the case studies and the analysis of the cases 
should adequately demonstrate how these variables are assessed.  
The cases (see Figure 2) were chosen based on their variation in the independent 
variable (the importance of the leader at the time of the decapitation operation).48  Aum 
Shinrikyo is the case study for cell I.  Its leader, Shoko Asahara, was both operationally 
and inspirationally important.  The Shining Path, or Sendero Luminoso, is an example of 
cell II.  While Guzman was both inspirationally and operationally critical in the early 
years of Sendero, he was only inspirationally important when he was captured in 1992. 
The GIA is an example of cases in cells I, III, and IV.  The leadership of the GIA moved 
from cell IV to cell III to cell I, all the while overcoming multiple decapitations of its 
leaders.  The case studies will be followed by some preliminary analysis of how the death 
or capture of bin Laden would affect al-Qaeda.  
Figure 2: Case Studies
48 The universe of cases numbers in the hundreds.  For the largest set, see Jordan, “When Heads Roll,” p. 
13, who identifies 298 cases of leadership targeting against 96 organizations. 
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AUM SHINRIKYO IN JAPAN
Aum Shinrikyo (or Supreme Truth) was a cult founded in 1984 by Shoko Asahara in 
Japan and is best known as the perpetrator of the 1995 sarin gas bombings in the Tokyo 
subway system.  Aum Shinrikyo emerged in the 1980s and 1990s when cults and “new 
religions” were proliferating in Japan.  Aum grew from around 1,500 members in 1987 to 
possibly up to 50,000 by 1994, including tens of thousands in Russia.49  
49 For more on Aum’s origins and growth, see Daniel A. Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese  
Society (Lewsiton, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000); John Parachini, “Aum Shinrikyo,” in Brian A Jackson, 
John C. Baker, Kim Cragin, John Parachini, Horacio R. Trujillo, and Peter Clark, eds., Aptitude for  
Destruction: Volume 2, Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (RAND, 2005); 
Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It: Aum Shinrikyo, Apocalyptic Violence, and the New 
Global Terrorism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1999); Galanter and Forest, “Cults, Charismatic 
Groups, and Social Systems;” David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World:  
The Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to the Nuclear Arsenals of  
Russia (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996); D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New 
York: Weatherhill, 1996); and Ian Reader, “Spectres and Shadows: Aum Shinrikyô and the Road to 
Megiddo,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring 2002).
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In 1988, Aum Shinrikyo built a complex among the foothills of Mount Fuji where 
members would come and live after rejecting the outside world.50  Aum also began 
experimenting with various chemical and biological agents in its Mount Fuji complex, 
including botulism, anthrax, Q fever, Ebola, VX and sarin.51  Aum’s activities began to 
draw unwanted attention from the police, who planned a simultaneous raid on all the 
group’s facilities on March 21 or 22, 1995.  Asahara decided to pre-empt the raid by 
launching the planned attack on the Tokyo subway.  On Monday morning, March 20, five 
Aum members with eleven bags of sarin boarded five different subway trains that would 
converge at the Kasumigaseki station. The attacks killed twelve people and injured 
5,500.52
From Aum’s beginning to its end, Shoko Asahara (born Chizuo Matsumoto) was 
its leader, founder, and central figure.  Ashara was extremely charismatic, and developed 
a cult of personality around himself in which he was infallible, all-powerful, and all-
knowing.53  According to Metraux, “Aum publications do make one factor abundantly 
clear: Asahara is portrayed as an ‘enlightened super-human’ with divine powers at the 
50 Gavin Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation: Lessons from Aum Shinrikyo and Al Qaida,” Studies  
in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1999), p. 284; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the 
World, pp. 21-22, 77, 89-90; Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It, pp. 31-33, 36.
51 For more on their weapons programs, see William Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Biological Weapons 
Program: Why Did it Fail?” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2001); Kaplan and Marshall, 
The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 51, 58, 85, 94, 96, 119-122, 124, 216; Parachini, “Aum Shinrikyo,” 
pp. 19-25; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), p. 124; Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 109. 
52 Brackett, Holy Terror, pp. 1-7, 121-142; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, p. 236; 
Tim Ballard, Jason Pate, Gary Ackerman, Diana McCauley, and Sean Lawson, “Chronology of Aum 
Shinrikyo’s CBW Activities,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International 
Studies (2001).
53 Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation,” p. 280 refers to Asahara’s leadership as “autocratic 
mysticism.”  See also Reader, “Spectres and Shadows,” p. 149; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End 
of the World, pp. 3, 67, 101; Angus M. Muir, “Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Case of 
Aum Shinrikyo (A Review Article), Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1999), p. 81; Kyle 
Olson, “Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?” Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July-
August 1999), p. 515; James K. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (Seminole, FL: 
Interpact Press, 1997), p. 63; Galanter and Forest, “Cults, Charismatic Groups, and Social Systems,” pp. 
62-67.
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level of Buddha and Jesus.  Any Asahara devotee can improve his position in life 
(emancipation and enlightenment) and escape rebirth in human form only at the behest of 
Asahara himself – through his touch or blessing.”54   
In terms of ideology, Asahara himself determined the problem, enemy, solution, 
means, and context.  “Asahara created this belief system [ideology] for the express 
purpose of recruiting and manipulating a membership that truly wanted to believe they 
could be part of something greater.”55  According to the preaching of Asahara, the 
corruption and materialism of modern Japan was the problem.  He exhorted his followers 
to leave “this filthy world of desires” and live at his compound on Mount Fuji to achieve 
spiritual enlightenment.56  The enemy was the modern, outside world of Japanese society, 
the Japanese government, and the United States – all of whom were viewed as legitimate 
targets of violence.57  
The solution was the destruction of the known world and the creation of a new 
order, which he would lead.58  For context, Asahara blended concepts from Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Christianity, and Judaism with his own worldview.  He took the concepts of 
Armageddon and the apocalypse and mixed them together with the prophecies of 
Nostradamus to predict that the end of the world was approaching and that only those 
who had achieved a state of enlightenment (i.e., his followers) would be able to survive.59 
54 Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, p. 21.  
55 Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, p. 64.
56 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 21, 59; Cameron, “Multi-track 
Microproliferation,” p. 280; Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It, p. 24.
57 Reader, “Spectres and Shadows,” p. 151.
58 Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, pp. 19, 49-53; Lifton, Destroying the World to  
Save It, p. 59.
59 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, p. 17; Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on 
Japanese Society, p. iii;  Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It, pp. 4-6, 8, 45.
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The means of achieving these goals included drugs, meditation, blood rituals, and 
violence.   The ultimate experience for Aum members was the “Blood Initiation,” in 
which they would pay $7,000 to drink a small glass of Asahara’s blood.  Aum also used 
violence, severely beating disciples in the compound for even minor “transgressions;” 
more serious offenders were placed in isolation cells in which a video of Asahara played 
on a continuous loop; some disobedient members and even non-members were killed. 
Violence was also seen as a legitimate way of speeding up the coming of the 
apocalypse.60  
Operationally, Asahara made strategic, tactical, and organizational decisions for 
Aum Shinrikyo, maintaining direct control over almost all aspects of the group’s 
activities.  Strategically, he decided how Aum would achieve its goals, the mix of means 
to do so, and the targets to attack to achieve the desired results. Asahara was responsible 
for the shift from religious preaching to politics and then to violence.61  
Tactically, Asahara was involved with the detailed planning of many operations, 
choosing the timing, method or tactic, and specific target for the operation.  When Aum 
members tried to leave the organization, Asahara gave direct orders that they be killed.62 
Asahara himself directly ordered several attacks on Aum’s enemies, including a sarin 
attack prior to the subway operation.  He often hand-selected the members who would 
participate in an operation.  When the police began suspecting Aum of producing sarin, 
Asahara gave the order to stop production and destroy the facilities. (Production was later 
60 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 17, 18, 23, 36-43, 113-118, 162, 173, 212, 
228; Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, pp. iv, 12, 18-20, 32, 45; Campbell, Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Terrorism, pp. 64-65; and Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It, pp. 26-27, 36-41, 
179-193; Brackett, Holy Terror, pp. 9-10, 19; Parachini, “Aum Shinrikyo,” p. 13; Cameron, “Multi-track 
Microproliferation,” pp. 285-287; According Ballard et al, “Chronology of Aum,” Aum launched 17 CBW 
attacks between 1990 and 1995.
61 See Parachini, “Aum Shinrikyo.”
62 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 36, 41, 227.
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resumed.)  Asahara explicitly targeted those subway lines that converged on 
Kasumigaseki station for the sarin attacks in 1995.  Even though the sarin was not yet as 
pure as it could have been, Asahara gave the order to launch the attack.63
Organizationally, Asahara was central to Aum’s recruitment, internal structure, 
and financing.  Aum was “highly centralized around the figure of Shoko Asahura…
Aum’s structure was cohesive and extremely hierarchical.”64  “Asahara fired off regular 
memos to all Aum branches, dictating penalties for various transgressions.”65  He was 
intimately involved with many of the initiation rituals, further boosting his cult of 
personality.  Asahara was critical to Aum’s internal organization.  In 1994, “Asahara 
ordered a sweeping reorganization, setting up the cult as a shadow government.”66 
Financially, Asahara was involved in nearly every money-making scheme, whether it 
involved selling his bathwater or hair, or hooking disciples to electrodes connected to his 
brainwaves.   
After the March 1995 subway attack, the police increased their focus on Aum 
Shinrikyo.67  They raided Aum’s compound on March 22 and began searching for 
Asahara, who was captured two months later.  By the end of April, 150 Aum members 
had been arrested, although none of these arrests was for sarin related crimes.  Finally, on 
May 6, the police found Asahara hiding in one of the buildings in the Mount Fuji 
complex.  Asahara and the entire leadership group of Aum were imprisoned.  By the end 
63 Brackett, Holy Terror, pp. 29, 32, 125; Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 215, 
238, 242; Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 125; Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It, p. 175.
64 Cameron, “Multi-track Microproliferation,” p. 283; Reader, “Spectres and Shadows,” p. 157. Parachini, 
“Aum Shinrikyo,” p. 17.
65 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, p. 23.
66 See Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism, p. 54 and Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 104; Kaplan 
and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, p. 157.
67 See John V. Parachini and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan and Aum Shinrikyo,” in Robert J. Art and Louise 
Richardson, eds., Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past (Washington, DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 2007), pp. 544-549.
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of 1995, 350 members had been detained and half of them were charged with crimes.68 
Asahara was found guilty and sentenced to death on February 27, 2004, joining eleven 
other Aum members who had already received death sentences.69 Since 1995, what 
remained of Aum “evolved into a small and peaceful sect whose members live quietly in 
small communities across Japan.”70  While it continues to practice as a religious cult, 
Aum is still “a skeleton of its former self.”71  
Asahara was both inspirationally and operationally critical to Aum Shinrikyo and 
so one would expect the organization to have a difficult time replacing him as a leader. 
In fact, “Asahara regarded himself as an enlightened being with the unique power and 
ability to save the world”72 (emphasis added).  While Asahara’s cult of personality aided 
in the growth of the organization, it also made the group especially vulnerable to 
decapitation because, to a large extent, Ashara was Aum.  
 
SENDERO LUMINOSO IN PERU
Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) of Peru was a radical Marxist group that was most 
active in the 1980s and early 1990s.73  Its activities led to a climate of violence that 
resulted in nearly 70,000 deaths and $20 billion in economic damage, as well as 
68 Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 256-257, 277, 280, 285; Metraux, Aum 
Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, p. 20.
69 Norimitsu Onishi, “ After 8-Year Trial in Japan, Cultist Is Sentenced to Death,” New York Times 
(February 28, 2004)
70 Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, p. i.  
71 Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, p. 25.
72 Metraux, Aum Shinrikyo’s Impact on Japanese Society, p. 36.
73 For a concise background, see David Scott Palmer, “Countering Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of 
Shining Path in Peru,” in James J. F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century,  
Volume III (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007) and Gordon McCormick, “The Shining Path and Peruvian 
Terrorism,” in David Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988).  For more detailed accounts, see David Scott Palmer, ed., The Shining Path of Peru (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994); Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s  
FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998); and Philip 
Mauceri, State Under Siege: Development and Policy Making in Peru (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1996).
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widespread human rights abuses.74  Sendero grew from a few hundred original members 
to between 10,000 and 20,000 militants, and enjoyed the support of 20,000 to 30,000 
more individuals and the sympathy of perhaps millions more.75  As Sendero’s campaign 
of violence continued during the 1980s, many Peruvian and even international observers 
thought that the group might, in fact, succeed in toppling the Peruvian state.76   
Abimael Guzman played a critical role - especially inspirationally - throughout 
Sendero’s history.77  In terms of charisma, he intentionally and explicitly developed a cult 
of personality around himself, and his followers worshipped him almost as a deity.78 
Ideologically, it was his vision of Marxism that became the irrefutable ideology of 
Sendero.  His (i.e. Sendero’s) ideology was essentially classic Marxism, but adapted to 
the realities of Peru.  Guzman’s vision identified class inequality as the problem; the 
Peruvian state, its exploitive upper class, and its imperial partners as the enemy; a 
socialist state as the solution; violence as the only means of achieving these goals; and 
the context as one of timeless class struggle.79  
Operationally, Guzman became less critical as time went on.  Strategically, he 
created what he believed to be the blueprint for success, which began by creating 
74 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Final Report,” (2003) available at 
http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php; Palmer, “Countering Terrorism in Latin 
America.”
75 Michael Freeman, Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers  
to Fight Terror (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), p. 160.  Guzman’s computer at the time of his capture 
showed 23,430 members according to Turbiville, “Hunting Leadership Targets,” p. 32.
76 Carlos Ivan Degregori, “After the Fall of Abimael Guzmán: The Limits of Sendero Luminoso,” in 
Maxwell Cameron and Philip Mauceri, eds., The Peruvian Labyrinth: Polity, Society, Economy (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 188; Sandra Woy-Hazleton and William 
Hazleton, “Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 12, 
No. 2 (April 1990), p. 21; and McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, p. 10.
77 Palmer, “Countering Terrorism in Latin America,” p. 297.
78 See the video State of Fear: The Truth About Terrorism (Skylight Pictures, 2005).
79 William Hazleton and Sandra Woy-Hazleton, “Sendero Luminoso: A Communist Party Crosses a River 
of Blood,” Terrorism and Political Violence Vol. 4, No. 2 (summer 1992), p. 69.
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situations where Sendero power structures would replace those of the state.80  Sendero 
would also provoke violence from the state, which would also increase support among 
the population.81  Eventually, Guzman hoped to control the mountain areas, cut off Lima, 
and then eventually operate in Lima and overthrow the government of Peru.82  As the 
organization grew both in size and geographic reach, Guzman devolved much of the 
tactical control to his regional commanders.  While Guzman set this larger strategic 
vision for the organization, others made the local tactical decisions regarding who or 
what to attack, as well as how and when.83  As the leader of the Sendero Luminoso, 
Guzman moved from cell I in the early years to cell II as the organization grew in size 
and geographic scope.  
Guzman was captured by the National Counterterrorism Directorate (DINCOTE) 
of the Peruvian National Police on September 12, 1992.  Besides capturing Guzman, 
DINCOTE also seized several of his high ranking lieutenants and a computer with 
information on thousands of Shining Path members (23,430).84  This intelligence and 
information coup allowed the police to roll up almost the entire organization by capturing 
200 senderistas within a few days, over 1,000 in a few weeks, 3,600 in eighteen months, 
and 7,000 in two years.  Of the nineteen central committee members, twelve were 
captured in just the three months or so following Guzman’s arrest.85  In addition, Guzman 
called for a period of peace while in prison, which led to the surrender of more than 3,000 
80 Mauceri, State Under Seige, p. 122.
81 Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru, Robin Kirk, trans. (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), p. 104
82 Freeman, Freedom or Security, p. 148.
83 Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, pp. 84, 85, 87, 150.
84 Turbiville, “Hunting Leadership Targets,” p. 31-34.
85 Freeman, Freedom or Security, p. 164.
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senderistas.86  These surrenders and arrests, coupled with military defeats at the hands of 
armed peasant communities (rondas), devastated the organization and contributed to the 
widespread decline in its operations and the overall level of violence.87  
How does this case fit the model?  Guzman, through his charisma and ideology, 
provided the inspiration for the group.  He developed a robust cult of personality;88 
however, when Peruvian forces captured him, “Guzman’s heroic, mythical image was 
virtually destroyed.”89  After his capture, Guzman was shown on television dressed in 
unflattering prison garb while being held in a cage like a circus animal.90  Ideologically, 
Guzman was personally responsible for the ideology of the Shining Path; Sendero’s 
ideology was Guzman’s ideology.  Operationally, while Guzman set the strategic vision 
for the organization, practically all of the day-to-day operations were conducted by local 
or regional commanders.  In sum, then, at the time of his capture, Guzman was in cell II: 
important inspirationally but unimportant operationally.
Shining Path should have had a difficult time replacing his inspirational 
leadership, and this was, in fact, the case.  His successor, Oscar Ramirez Durand, never 
developed a charismatic cult of personality like Guzman did.  Ideologically, Ramirez 
could not compete with Guzman.  When Guzman essentially shifted Sendero’s ideology 
by calling for peace talks from his prison cell, Sendero split into two factions.  One 
supported a peace deal, while the second, led by Ramirez, chose to continue the armed 
struggle.91  When Ramirez was captured in 1999, the group further splintered along 
86 Richard Clutterbuck, “Peru: Cocaine, Terrorism and Corruption,” International Relations, Vol. 12 
(1995), pp. 86-87
87 Turbiville, “Hunting Leadership Targets,” p. 34.
88 McCormick, “Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism,” p. 123.
89 McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America, p. 92.  
90 See State of Fear and Turbiville, “Hunting Leadership Targets,” p. 33.
91 Center for Defense Information, “In the Spotlight: Sendero Luminoso,” (July 1, 2002) 
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/sendero.cfm
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ideological and geographical grounds, with numerous individuals claiming the mantle of 
leadership.92  
ALGERIA AND THE EMIRS OF THE GIA
The GIA (Group Islamique Armé or Armed Islamic Group) formed in 1992 in the midst 
of considerable political turmoil when the military leaders of the FLN (National 
Liberation Front) faced challenges from both liberal reformers and Islamists.93  When the 
government arrested more than 40,000 political Islamists from the FIS (Front Islamique 
du Salut or Islamic Salvation Front), “the initiative gradually passed to more violent 
groups,” like the GIA.94  The GIA grew in size and achieved its peak strength somewhere 
around 1996 or 1997, when it consisted of approximately 5,000-10,000 militants.95 
Membership dropped to approximately 2,000 in 1999 after the split with the GSPC 
(Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat or Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat); further widespread defections in the late 1990s, reduced the GIA to an 
estimated 100 militants in 2003.96  Overall, from 1992 to 2005, GIA-related violence was 
likely responsible for 150,000-200,000 deaths on all sides.97   
92 Dan Collyns, “Shining Path Leader Offers Truce,” BBC News (November 26, 2006)
93 For histories of Algeria, including its war for independence and the rise of the Islamist movement, see 
Luis Martinez, The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Hugh 
Roberts, The Battlefield Algeria 1988-2002: Studies in a Broken Polity (London: Verson, 2003); William 
B. Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria’s Transition from Authoritarianism (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Robert Mortimer, “Islamists, Soldiers, and Democrats: The Second 
Algerian War,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996); Martin Evans and John Phillips, 
Algeria: Anger of the Dispossesed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); Mohammed M. Hafez, 
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94 Kepel, Jihad, pp. 258-9; Evans and Phillips, Algeria, pp. 165, 190.
95 Mohammed M. Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria,” Middle East  
Journal, Vol. 4 (Fall 2000), p. 575 and Evans and Phillips, Algeria, p. 221.
96 “Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA),” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, accessed October 28, 2008, 
citing US State Department estimates.  
97 “GIA,” Jane’s; Kepel, Jihad, p. 254; Evans and Phillips, Algeria, p. xiv.
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During its short-lived existence, the GIA went through a steady succession of 
leaders, with probably eleven different leaders over a twelve-year span.  At least eight of 
the GIA emirs were killed – by the government or by their rivals – and two were captured 
or arrested.  The following list is a chronology of leadership within the GIA from 
1992-2004:98
1  st   emir: Abdellhaq Layada . September 1992 to May 1993 (arrested in Morocco).99
Period of indecision.  May to August 1993.100
2  rd   emir: Djafar al-Afghani  (also known as Mourad Si Ahmed or Seif Allah Djafar). 
August 1993 to February 26, 1994 (killed, probably based on information 
from an insider).101
3  th   emir: Cherif Gousmi (also known as Abu Abdallah Ahmed).  March 10, 1994 to 
September 26, 1994 (killed in action).102
4  th   emir: Mahfoud Tajine.   October 6 to October 27, 1994 (deposed).103    
5  th   emir: Djamel Zitouni.   October 27, 1994 to July 16, 1996 (killed by rivals).104
Period of indecision.  July 1996 to December 1996.
6  th   emir: Abu Selman  (also known as Farid Hamani).  December 1996 to January 
1997 (killed).105
98 In chronicling the list of emirs of the GIA there are frequent discrepancies between sources.
99  Kepel, Jihad, pp. 259, 262, 263; Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements,” p. 575.
100 Kepel, Jihad, p. 263.
101 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 79; Kepel, Jihad, pp. 263-264; Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements,” p. 
578.
102 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 79; Kepel, Jihad, p. 264-266; Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements,” p. 
577; Evans and Phillips, Algeria, p. 206.
103 Kepel, Jihad, p. 266.
104 Kepel, Jihad, pp. 267, 271; Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 119; Evans and Phillips, Algeria, p. 222.
105 “GIA,” Jane’s.
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7  th   emir: Antar Zouabri.   Early 1997 to February 8, 2002 (killed by Algerian 
security forces, possibly based on a tip from Hassan Hattab, the GSPC 
leader).106
8  th   emir: al-Rashid Abu Turab  (also known as Rashid Oukali).  February 2002 to 
July 2004 (killed by Boudiafi).107
9  th   emir: Nourredine Boudiafi .  July 2004 to November 2004 (captured).108 
10  th   emir: Guechniti Redouane.   November 2004 to (probably) December 2004 
(killed by Algerian security forces). 109
11  th   emir: Chaâbane Younes.   December 2004 (killed by Algerian security 
forces).110
 
The GIA began as a highly decentralized organization composed of dispersed 
semi-autonomous “roaming armed bands.”111  The GIA’s first emir, Layada, formed the 
GIA in September, 1992 when he united three different factions from within the jihadi 
movement.112  Even as a unified umbrella organization, the GIA under Layada and Djafar 
“operated in urban areas without overall direction…[and] the growth of the GIA between 
1993 and 1994 did not signify greater coordination and control…The GIA operated as a 
conglomeration of armed militias.”113  Gousmi completed the unification and 
106 Kepel, Jihad, p. 271; Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 168.
107 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 129; “GIA,” Jane’s.
108 “GIA,” Jane’s.
109 “GIA,” Jane’s. 
110 “GIA,” Jane’s.
111 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 115; Evans and Phillips, Algeria, p. 186; Hafez, “Armed Islamist 
Movements,” p. 576.
112 Kepel, Jihad, pp. 259-260.
113 Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 115.
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centralization of the jihad movement when leaders from rival groups formally announced 
their unity with the GIA on May 13, 1994.114  
Initially, the inspirational leadership of the GIA was relatively unimportant.  Its 
ideology was based on the relatively widespread Salafist/Wahhabist interpretation of 
Islam, and was not particularly tied to one leader’s ideological innovation or 
interpretation.115  In terms of charismatic leadership, the charisma of individual leaders 
aided their own rise to power and, to some degree, was required for their assumption of 
top leadership.  Much of the charisma of these leaders came from their experiences in 
battle.  
Over time, however, and particularly under the emirships of Zitouni and Zouabri, 
the ideological leadership of the GIA became more important.  These leaders pushed the 
GIA towards greater extremism, especially in their conceptions of the enemy and the 
amount of violence that was justified.  Zitouni began to consider all those opposed to 
them as apostate or infidels and worthy of being attacked.116  Zouabri continued and even 
escalated the policies of his mentor, with “a strategy of ever-increasing violence and 
redoubled purges within the GIA.”117  The level of violence in Algeria peaked in 1997, 
with “horrific massacres of civilians” in January and February and “bloodbaths” in 
August and September.118    
These ideological shifts came directly from the leadership.  Previous emirs had 
not gone in this direction, and external circumstances did not dictate this escalation into a 
more extreme ideology.  Not only did the leaders push the ideology to its extreme, they 
114 Kepel, Jihad, pp. 264-265.
115 Kepel, Jihad, p. 254
116 Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements,” p. 587. See also Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 167-168; Evans 
and Phillips, Algeria, p. 219.
117 Kepel, Jihad, p. 272.
118 Kepel, Jihad, pp. 272-273.
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also were successful in taking many of the followers with them, at least initially.  Over 
time, these inspirationally (specifically ideologically) important leaders proved to be 
powerful, yet destructive to the fortunes of the GIA.  As the atrocities committed by the 
GIA mounted, many members saw the shift to extremism as unjustified and even 
abhorrent.119  During the emirship of Zitouni, a group led by Hassan Hattab split off and 
formed the GSPC.120  Over time, most members of the GIA shifted to the GSPC (now 
called al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)).121  The ideological shift within the 
GIA, led by Zitouni and Zouabri, and the resultant defection of the “moderates,” show 
how the leaders of the GIA were inspirationally important, but detrimental to the 
organization.  
When the leaders of the GIA were in cell IV, one would expect decapitation to 
have been the least effective.  Even though Layada was arrested and Djafar was killed in 
action, the organization maintained its tempo and focus.  Gousmi successfully completed 
the centralization begun by Layada, shifting the GIA into cell III.  At this stage, the 
leaders were slightly more important, but only in terms of coordinating operations, and 
not for any inspirational guidance, and therefore relatively easy to replace.  Gousmi’s 
successors – Zitouni and Zouabri – provided more inspiration with their ideological 
innovations, and so the leadership of the GIA shifted into cell I, where they the most 
vulnerable to decapitation.  After Zouabri was killed in 2002, the GIA further 
disintegrated with successive leaders incapable of justifying the extreme levels of 
violence.  Additionally, several leaders were killed in quick succession in 2004.  Without 
strong leaders capable of inspiring their followers with their apocalyptic visions, 
119 Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements,” p. 588.
120 Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements,” p. 589; Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, p. 119. Kepel, Jihad, 270.
121 For a background on the GSPC, see Jean-Luc Marret, “Al-Qaeda in Islamic Magrev: A “Glocal” 
Organization,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 6 (June 2008).
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increasing numbers of GIA members left for the GSPC, leaving the GIA with around one 
hundred fighters dispersed across Algeria.122  
Extending the Model to Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden
What does all this mean for current and future cases of leadership targeting?  The 
theoretical framework developed above, along with the lessons learned from Aum 
Shinrikyo the Shining Path, and the GIA should be useful in understanding the dynamics 
of targeting Osama bin Laden.  
How important is bin Laden to al-Qaeda?  Initially, bin Laden was important in 
inspiring al-Qaeda members.  His great ideological innovation was to focus the attention 
of jihadis on their common “far enemy,” the West, rather than on their individual “near 
enemies.”123  Additionally, he is, by all accounts, highly charismatic,124 a characteristic 
that is enhanced by his ascetic lifestyle and by his reputation (perhaps apocryphal) for 
fighting bravely during the 1980s in Afghanistan.   Over time, though, his inspiration has 
been institutionalized.  His message of a global jihad has been picked up by other 
ideologues, and is readily available through texts, the internet, and videos.  By the end of 
122 The demise of the GIA was a result of several factors besides the decapitation of its leadership. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Algerian security forces became more aggressive in their counter-
insurgency operations, while also offering clemency to militants, according to Evans and Phillips, Algeria, 
pp. 218-219, 279.  Another serious blow was struck by the round-up of over 400 members in late 2004, 
according to Lauren Vriens, “Armed Islamic Group (Algeria),” Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9154/.
123 Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 
Places” (1996) http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html. For more on the 
ideological and strategic divides within the jihadi movement, see “Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership 
Schisms in Al—Qa’ida 1989-2006,” Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 
(September 2007), http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/Harmony_3_Schism.pdf; Kepel, Jihad; and Fawaz Gerges, 
The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
124 Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 75
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the 1990s, bin Laden had grown increasingly less important as the catalyst for al-Qaeda’s 
ideology.125  
Operationally, bin Laden reportedly initially controlled many of the strategic, 
tactical, and organizational decisions.  Strategically, attacking the far enemy had to be 
justified because many felt that attacking the west would prove counterproductive.126 
This strategic focus on the West remains controversial, as seen by recent debates within 
al-Qaeda over whether to focus on Pakistan or the United States.  Nevertheless, the 
existence of this recent strategic debate and bin Laden’s silence of several years highlight 
that he has been operationally marginalized, perhaps intentionally, by his own 
organization.127  Tactically, bin Laden was responsible for several early operations, 
especially the 1998 embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania.  Since then, bin Laden has 
acted more like a venture capitalist; individuals and groups come to him with a plan or an 
idea, and he decides whether to finance and support their operations.128  Bin Laden 
appears to have exerted almost no tactical control over al-Qaeda attacks since 2001, when 
anyone subscribing to its ideology can conduct attacks in its name or in its cause.129  The 
attacks on Madrid in [2004] and London in [2005] are examples of this. 
Organizationally, bin Laden was important in the creation of al-Qaeda in the 1990s, 
especially in setting up training bases in Afghanistan and forging alliances with other 
terrorist groups and the Taliban government.  Since 2001 and the U.S. occupation of 
Afghanistan, however, bin Laden’s ability to provide these functions has been severely 
curtailed.130  
125 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
126 Gerges, The Far Enemy.
127 Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Al Qaeda’s Feuds and Fears,” Newsweek (October 1, 2007).  
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Overall, bin Laden’s importance to al-Qaeda has shifted from cell I through cell II 
to cell IV.  In the late 1990s, he began to relinquish operational control, but remained an 
inspirational figure to many jihadis.131  By the early 2000s, his inspiration had been 
institutionalized and his organization decentralized to the point that al-Qaeda is now more 
of a movement or ideology than a coherent organization.  The death or capture of bin 
Laden, therefore, would likely have little effect on al-Qaeda because he is no longer 
important to them as a leader.132  Of course, bin Laden can also re-establish his 
importance to the organization.  
Conclusion
While it often seems as if the decapitation of an enemy leader would be a shortcut 
to victory, the empirical record has shown that targeting leaders has mixed outcomes. 
There are some cases of success, as in Japan, Peru, eventually in Algeria, and elsewhere, 
but there are also cases of ineffective decapitations, such as the early years in Algeria, 
and many others.  To explain these different outcomes, this paper developed a theory of 
leadership that identifies what leaders do for an organization and how their importance 
changes over time.  Leadership targeting is most likely to be effective when leaders are 
operationally and/or inspirationally important.  While this theoretical conceptualization of 
the importance of leaders matches the empirical record explored in the case studies, 
131 Bruce Hoffman, “Redefining Counterterrorism: The Terrorist Leader as CEO,” RAND Review, (Spring 
2004) refers to bin Laden as a combination of a CEO and venture capitalist.
132 Abu Yahya al-Libi is seen by some as the “heir apparent” to bin Laden, according to Michael Moss and 
Souad Mekhennet, “Rising Leader for Next Phase of Al Qaeda’s War,” New York Times (April 4, 2008).
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further research could explore the robustness of this explanation beyond its mere 
plausibility.  
According to this theory of leadership, targeting bin Laden would be ineffective 
in undermining al-Qaeda.  Therefore, in deciding whether to target an enemy leader, one 
must first ask whether that leader is even important to the organization, in addition to 
questions about some secondary effects and practical concerns.  In a world with scarce 
resources, this kind of careful analysis is required so that neither time nor energy is 
wasted.     
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